Has Globalization Resulted In The Retreat Of The Nation-State?

Research Discipline - International Political Economy

INTRODUCTION

As the web of financial, technological and production structures is constantly moving across national borders and economic activity becomes more fundamentally global, ‘it has become a cliché to say that we live in the age of globalization’.[1] Economic interdependence has become a fact of life and the relevance of the nation-state has been put under constant attack, at least at a theoretical level. This paper will analyse the polemic between two scholarly opposing views on the role of the state in a highly globalized world market. The main concern will be given to the nature of the international economic order and its true effects upon the role of the state over its national affairs. Taking into account key components of globalization such as technological change, capital movement, international trade, labour migration and societal security while making use of empirical evidence, it will conclude that although its nature of operation has changed, the nation-state is necessary and still the primary actor holding the monopoly to hard power and regulating the functioning of the global market.

1) THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The tension between the state and the global markets has been the centre theme of many books and articles in the field of international political economy. Scholars like Susan Strange have written about the “Retreat of the State” while others like Robert Gilpin argue that ‘the nation-state continues to be the major actor in both domestic and international affairs’.[2] Do states still determine the nature of the market or does the global economic order constrain the state and dictate its national policies? This is the central question to this debate. In Strange’s view ‘the impersonal forces of world markets, integrated over the post war period more by private enterprise in finance, industry and trade than by the cooperative decisions of governments, are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong’.[3] Gilpin disagrees by noting that ‘even though its role may have diminished somewhat, the nation-state remains preeminent in both domestic and international economic affairs’.[4] Others are convinced that ‘globalization is largely a myth’.[5]

2) TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

The 20^th Century has seen some of the most advanced technological changes in the whole history of human kind. From horses to cars, from letters to telegraphs, then to telephones and now the internet, the world certainly seems smaller. During the past decades, the rapid advance of technological capability has shifted the state-market balance and has raised serious questions about the true authority governing the structures of the world markets. The telecommunications revolution has made it easier to move information around the world and transfer large amounts of capital across borders. However, as David Balaam explains, ‘to gain the maximum advantage, one needs to control access to new knowledge and technology – to keep others from using the products or research and innovation without paying in full for the right’.[6] This might explain why the US government holds key technological pieces of information as a matter of national security. Within private markets too, governments continue to interfere and regulate. Take ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers which at first sight is a private corporation overseeing the distribution of unique IP addresses and domain names over the internet. However, this private corporation was the creation of the US government in 1998.[7] Another good example of government regulation would be the anti-trust case against Microsoft, the biggest computer maker in the world. In 2001, the US Justice Department imposed “behavioural remedies” and in 2004, the EU fined the corporation for €500m ordering it to change its behaviour. Such cases clearly demonstrate that although MNC’s can hold the monopoly of one sector of the technology market, national governments can and do regulate their behaviour, thus restricting their authority.

3) CAPITAL MOVEMENT & INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Globalization is very much about the increasing economic activity across borders and the integration of national markets into one international economic order. If transnational corporations are increasingly moving capital across borders then it would be hard to see the state benefiting from territorial control. In this borderless world the realist model of the state is questionable. Indeed, as Peter Evans notes, ‘in a global economy where there is a surplus of labour, control over large amounts of territory and population can be more of a burden than an asset’.[8] When the system of states used to operate in a fixed exchange rate environment, industrialized countries were in control of capital flows. But ‘by the end of the 1980’s, by contrast, capital controls had been dismantled and the value of currencies was left more to markets than to states’.[9] Based on the above assumption, any state policies that go against the international trade and financial markets will logically harm the value of its currency and damage its prospective capital gains. In such an economic environment, states are not the unitary players determining the markets. If this were true, one of the major effects of globalization is the increase of state dependency upon international trade thus declining state authority over the society it governs. However, this perceived decline is contradicted by Geoffrey Garrett’s data from OECD countries which suggests that ‘exposure to trade, FDI flows, and left-labour power were all associated with greater (government) spending after 1985’.[10] Furthermore, the growth of East Asian economies over the past decades goes against the argument that globalization reduces state power. In the case of China, the government has partially liberalized trade while still manipulating the country’s exchange rate. Despite tight government control, the Chinese economy grew by 9.5% last year, its fastest clip in eight years.[11] Indeed, a higher degree of openness exposes the national economy to greater shocks thus demanding stronger regulatory policies. The striking cases of Japan, South Korea and China today, offer strong proof that international trade and openness can go hand in hand with a high degree of state centrality.

4) LABOUR MIGRATION & SOCIETAL SECURITY

As today’s world is increasingly determined by global activities, the nature of production has changed mainly due to the technological revolution and has produced a labour vacuum which has been filled by economic migrants. This is more typical of the EU and the USA where farm and heavy industry jobs have been filled by workers from developing countries. However, increasing evidence suggests that governments are intervening against mass migration in order to protect the welfare system offered to their citizens. This is evident through tougher migration policies in the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, the USA and even Australia. The rise of far right parties across Europe and the popular support for strict policies indicates the high expectations that a society has towards its government. The above is what Joanne van Selm calls “Societal Security”. Her argument is that as European states’ main concerns have shifted away from the conventional protection of territorial sovereignty, one suggestion in IR literature is ‘that the facet of the state which needs protecting is its identity, and that the threat to that identity is immigration’.[12] The identity factor in here is important because of its direct connection with the necessity of the state in a highly globalized market. If the state is declining in the face of uncontrollable international markets, up to what degree can its capacity be reduced? If transnational companies become more powerful than state actors, they would maximize the risk element to such extend that ‘societal security’ would be disturbed. This is more obvious among EU countries where citizens expect the state to be the sole guarantor of their social rights, from health care to unemployment benefits, public transport and national pension schemes. Even where parts of these services are provided by private entities such as private universities or clinics, the state acts as a regulator of teaching and health standards. Trading the above with a financial theatre where the state has retreated and multinationals rule the markets, thus owning the individual’s fate, would be unthinkable in any EU member state. The importance of the state-society relationship is also illustrated by the weak financial infrastructure in developing countries. The collapse of pyramid schemes in Albania in 1997, where most citizens had invested their life savings, resulted in popular anger and civil unrest which in turn collapsed the government itself. Such lack of state centrality killed the prospects of any FDI’s over the following years. Common political logic suggests that a solid and stable state is needed in order to provide the orderly infrastructure for foreign direct investment and a stable financial market.[13]

CONCLUSION

As the above brief analysis and empirical evidence suggests, we are not witnessing the retreat of the state but rather a transformation of its role from provider to regulator. Serious rethinking of the state’s role ‘would legitimize new efforts to turn states into effective instruments for the achievement of collective goals’.[14] While much of the contemporary rhetoric suggests that the globalization of markets is constraining state policies, evidence suggests that governments still control the legal infrastructure of transnational markets. The post cold war world has created a different kind of environment where states are not the unitary players determining the markets. However, macroeconomic policies are extremely effective in constraining the economic activity of non-state actors. The US Federal Reserve or the ECB can determine the evolution of economic activity by controlling interest rates. The result of statelessness would be total anarchy where MNC’s would behave like armed gangs around the dark streets of a city. Furthermore, strong markets need strong and responsible states which can guarantee order and enforce laws within an anarchic financial system. Finally, if evidence suggests that the state is a kind of regulator policing the infrastructure of the current global economic order, then it would not make sense to speak of state retreat but of state transformation.

Bibliography

Block, Fred (1997), The Vampire State: And Other Myths and Fallacies About the U.S. Economy,

(New York: New Press)

Evans, Peter (1997) ‘The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of

Globalization’, World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 62-87

Garrett, Geoffrey (1998) ‘Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous

Circle?’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 787-824

Gilpin, Robert (2001), Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic

Order, 2^nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)

Hirst, Paul, and Thompson, Grahame (1999), Globalization in Question: The International

Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, 2^nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press)

Oatley, Thomas (2004), International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global

Economy, (New York: Pearson Education, Inc)

Strange, Susan (1996), The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Van Selm, Joanne, ed. (2000), Kosovo’s Refugees in the European Union (New York: Pinter)

Online Sources

The Economist (Mar 23^rd 2004) ‘Another Attempt to Tame the Monopolist’

The Economist (Jan 27^th 2005) ‘No Sign of Landing’

European Union (EU): http://www.europa.eu.int

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): http://www.oecd.org

The International Monetary Fund (IMF): http://www.imf.org

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[1] Balaam (2001), p. 444.

[2] Gilpin (2001), p. 362.

[3] Strange (1996), p. 4.

[4] Gilpin (2001), p. 362.

[5] Hirst & Thompson (1999), p. 2.

[6] Balaam (2001), p. 214.

[7] Look at http://www.icann.org for more information.

[8] Evans (1997), p. 66.

[9] Block (1997).

[10] Garrett (1995), p. 816.

[11] The Economist, No sign of a landing, Jan 27th 2005

[12] Van Selm (2000), p. 11.

[13] Personal conversation with Col. Steven Bucci, US Military Attachee in Albania during the 1990’s.

[14] Evans (1997), p. 83.

Research Abstracts

Culture Is The Primary Force Shaping International Politics In The Contemporary Era – A Theoretical Discussion

Research Discipline - Concepts and Methods in International Relations

Abstract

As international politics is practiced in an increasingly global structure of interdependence, culture is making a major breakthrough within the theories of international relations. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the triumph of the Western political and economical system, world politics has been transformed and has produced a progressive shift of balance within the theoretical discourses. Traditionally, mainstream IR has brutally marginalized the role of culture and identity in international politics by heavily focusing on material facts where ideas did not matter. But postpositivist, constructivist, poststructuralist and feminist theorists have fiercely battled to bring culture and identity to the forefront of the discipline by highlighting the deficiencies and the limitations of the neo-realist paradigm.

This paper argues that culture is primary in shaping all major elements of international politics. The main argument is divided into three parts. First, it seeks to define culture, identify its location within IR’s theoretical spectrum and show how some critical approaches have battled to highlight its primacy. Second, it analyses interest and power, key neo-realist concepts, and proves that culture and knowledge are crucial factors in understanding them. Third, it analyses the transformative qualities of structure by looking at cases of conflict and economic interdependence, showing that global interaction does not take place in a static world. The paper concludes by emphasizing the primacy of culture and identity as forces that shape contemporary international politics.

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World of States or ‘State’ of the World?

Between the State and the Individual, there is a disputed narrative of International Relations.

Research Discipline - Human Rights and Migration, International Relations

Abstract

The State is not going anywhere! This becomes increasingly evident as one seeks to draw a fair account of world politics today. However, there can be little doubt that human rights, which place the Individual at their heart, are constantly changing the language, strategy and subsequently the character of the liberal democratic State.[1] IR theorists on all sides have engaged in a scholarly war to make sense of recent developments without a clear outcome. On the one side, neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer insist on their rational choice theory and its state-centrist approach. On the opposite side, confronting this traditional (possibly American) account of IR, stand critical theorists such as Alexander Wendt and Mervyn Frost with their emphasis on the Individual and its human rights. The two camps do not have to be eternal enemies. Rather, they could produce a very powerful alliance and contribute immensely to our understanding of today’s world politics.

My argument throughout this short monograph is based on the analysis of recent developments of human rights in a world of states and investigates how the individualisation of the nation-state has produced a multiplicity of micro-strategies that is encouraging a more active supranational citizenship within the international system of world politics. The universal language of human rights is transforming the role of citizenship through its powerful influence on the legal spheres of democratic states. Contrary to what some scholars believe, the advances of ethics and human rights within the administrative and enforcement structures do not weaken the State. Instead, they strengthen its legitimacy.

As I intend to show throughout the analysis that follows, the State and the Individual are inseparable – the sovereign cannot survive without individual rights and rights cannot be enjoyed without the protection of the sovereign.

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[1] The capitalization of “Individual” and “State” throughout this essay implies the presumption of both as central players in world politics.

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Still Knocking on IR’s Doors…

Feminist approaches to IR have enriched the discipline, but they are not central to it.

Research Discipline - International Relations

Abstract

When travelling across different camps and theoretical approaches within international relations, it becomes clearly evident that women are almost completely absent from this traditionally men’s field of study. This is the backbone of feminist theory, which came very late into the domain of international relations. Its main purpose has been to identify women as active actors in global politics and give way to a whole new dimension of understanding the international structure by questioning the very rules that have constructed such a practice. However, just as there are personal views there are strands of feminism but if one had to choose between IR feminist scholars, the four most influential canonical writers would be Jean Bethke Elshtain, Cynthia Enloe, J. Ann Tickner and Christine Sylvester. Although each of these theorists brings a different approach of feminism, their work deals largely with gender (women in this case) as well as its social construction in local and international politics.

Despite its developments, feminist scholarship is often strongly resisted by academic gatekeepers, for it reveals the partial and gendered nature of intellectual work which is built on (elite?) men’s experiences.[1] This paper looks at the contributions of feminism as a whole and analyses its place among mainstream IR theories.

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[1] Pettman (2001), p. 583.

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Is Terrorism Really the Most Dangereous Threat
to European Security Today, or Has it Simply
Captured the Headlines of the Popular Media?

Research Discipline - European Security, International Relations

Abstract

September 11^th 2001, strengthened the view that the post-Cold War world was a fundamentally different environment where the nature of threats and the multiplicity of international actors had dramatically transformed the conduct of post-modern states towards each-other. Terrorism has been a major defining force in today’s international order. It has struck at the heart of powerful nations, it has shown that it is increasingly sophisticated and transnational and has created serious divergences between powerful military alliances.

This paper argues that terrorism is (truly) the most dangerous threat to European security today and that failure to accept it as such can result in catastrophic consequences for the future of world security. The main argument is divided into three sections. First, it looks at how the European Union defines terrorism and the tools it has employed to combat it. Second, it argues that the EU’s unique perception and muddled handling of it can in turn threaten NATO’s future and have grave effects upon the transatlantic alliance. Finally, it suggests that as terrorism is changing into a global activity, the EU needs to strengthen its international security role not only at the diplomatic level but through military means too.

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Does the Transatlantic Security
Relationship have a future?

Research Discipline - European Security, Defense Studies, International Relations

Abstract

The end of the Cold War has given birth to a new world order which has profoundly shaken up the transatlantic security relationship. Until 1989 NATO’s existence depended heavily upon the Soviet Union’s threat and a strong American presence on European soil. But since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the emergence of democratic states in Eastern Europe the transatlantic security relationship has struggled to find a new raison d’etre. Although the alliance seemed united during the crisis of ex-Yugoslavia in the 90’s, since September 11^th 2001, the fundamental purpose of the alliance’s existence is continually being questioned by scholars and policy makers across both sides of the Atlantic. This scepticism has emerged from the diverging views that America and Europe have about international threats, their nature and ways to tackle them. Each side confronts the other with its own understanding and vision of a more peaceful world. Such differences can undermine the future of a partnership that has survived for over half a century and emphasize the need for transformation and better communication to ensure its future. Could NATO expand its activities beyond the boundaries of the alliance, and if so, would that mean that its original purpose of creation as well as its operating territory would have to be redefined? Examining the growing differences between America and Europe, this essay analyzes their depths and attempts to provide a more optimistic view for the partnership’s future. The changing nature of global threats in today’s world requires a redefinition of NATO’s original role and calls for a radical transformation of the alliance’s military and intelligence capabilities. Better realization of shared values and interests across the Atlantic, accompanied by enlargement and the expansion of its activities should provide the foundations for a solid future of the alliance.

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Kosovo’s Refugees in the European Union - Book Review

STUCK IN-BETWEEN BORDERS

Book Review, November 2004

RALF GJONI

Kosovo’s Refugees in the European Union, London: Pinter, 2000, 239 pp

edited by Joanne van Selm[1]

Chapter 7, pp139-161

Italy: gateway to Europe, but not the gatekeeper? by Christopher Hein

Chapter 8, pp162-188

France: international norms, European integration and state discretion by Sandra Lavenex

It would be extremely hard to find a political analyst today who does not think that the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s produced some of the most horrific and brutal forms of genocide since the 2^nd world war. In February 1998, after the Bosnian conflict had calmed down, Serbian paramilitary groups and Yugoslav security forces intensified their attacks on Kosovar Albanians who were blamed for cooperating with the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army). The ‘ethnic cleansing’, which reached its brutal peak a year later, provoked NATO’s military intervention against Yugoslavia’s army, police and Serbian paramilitary forces in Kosovo. By this time, thousands of Kosovar Albanians had been massacred, 426,000 crossed the border into Albania, 228,000 to Macedonia (FYROM) and around 45,000 to Montenegro. In addition, 260,000 Albanians were internally displaced and over 100,000 had already sought political asylum in western European countries. It is estimated that by the end of bombing the entire 1,8m Albanian population of Kosovo had been displaced, internally and externally.

Joanne van Selm in “Kosovo’s Refugees in the European Union” analyses the reactions of several EU members towards this genocide which resulted in one of Europe’s biggest refugee crisis at the end of the 20^th century.

It is my intent to produce a critical review of two chapters (Italy and France) in the light of the greater purpose of the book. I will discuss the insights and research that each chapter brings to the reader and evaluate the methodology and accuracy of the information presented. While offering a critical approach within the general intent of the book, I will judge the academic contribution made to the field of asylum research.

The book, which is a collection of chapters written by different researchers and edited by Joanne van Selm, approaches the Kosovar asylum cases within a developing common EU immigration and asylum policy. It analyses the management of crisis by seven EU states and reflects on how the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees has (or has not) been implemented in each country. Both Italy and France are very interesting cases when writing about Kosovar Albanian refugees. Italy, owing much to its geographical proximity to the region, and France, because of its long and proud tradition of “terre d’asile”.

As Christopher Hein points out in his chapter “Italy: gateway to Europe, but not the gatekeeper?”, it would be hard to analyse Italy’s reaction to the Kosovo crisis without considering the country’s proximity to the Balkans. Above all, Hein discusses the reception of the Kosovar refugees within a wider internal transformation of Italy, that is, the evolution from “emigration” to “immigration” country.

The author gives a profound overview of the dramatic changes that Italy has undergone through the way in which it has handled refugee crisis since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. Of particular interest is the fact that since 1986, Italy has periodically been regularizing illegal aliens through a series of ad-hoc labour amnesties which subsequently have produced a low number of asylum seekers in the country. This explains why in Hein’s view, “an unknown number of de facto refugees prefer to make use of the regularization opportunity… rather than undergo the tiresome and uncertain asylum procedure”. This might also explain the low interest of the public opinion in the asylum cases. While a large part of the chapter is concerned with Italy’s legal background instead of Kosovar refugee’s reception, Hein’s discussion is helpful when explaining how the 1951 Geneva Convention was overshadowed by the 1990’s, period when a series of ad-hoc rules were developed to deal with specific refugee crisis. During the Kosovo crisis in 1999, Italy strongly promoted the idea of “reception in the region” (this largely meant Albania) and stressed that it did not want to encourage any “ethnic cleansing” by a large reception of Kosovar refugees in the country. Instead, the Italian government would support the Albanian state in the creation of reception centres. The author correctly points to the illegal smuggling of Kosovar refugees by Albanian groups through the Adriatic, although this traffic was a small part of the broader crisis. This, together with daily TV images of Kosovar refugees forced to leave their homes and cross the border into Albania or Macedonia provoked a hugely influential wave of public solidarity which then, forced the Italian government to join other European countries in pledging to receive a quota of 10,000 persons. (Who would be evacuated from camps in Macedonia).

Christopher Hein[2] is no stranger to the important role family and friends play in the refugee’s preferred destination for asylum. “In fact, a considerable number of Kosovar refugees had used Italy only as a transit country in order to reach Switzerland, Germany or, to a lesser degree, other European countries”, he writes when placing the Kosovars into the wider context of “labour immigration” in Germany or Switzerland. The Albanian, Italian and German press was full of stories of “illegal immigrants” smuggled through the Otranto channel into the southern coast of Italy and then transported to the destination country. By placing the Italian reception of Kosovar refugees within the greater process of European integration, the author raises highly important questions about the influence of European security concerns on national agendas and internal political debates.

Sandra Levenex[3] raises similar concerns in her chapter “France: international norms, European integration and state discretion”. While France kept a low profile during the Kosovo crisis, the French government has always been eager to remind other nations of its proud historical role as “terre d’asile”. Although France differs from Italy in that it has the longest tradition of refugee protection among European states, Lavenex provides convincing proof of its government’s preference on the concept of temporary protection rather than that of the 1951 Convention.

Through further consideration of France’s past experiences with refugees coming from violent regions, such as the case of the Algerians, Lavenex highlights the dominant role these cases played in shaping secondary forms of temporary protection when dealing with Kosovar refugees. Through observation of several ad-hoc measures taken by the French government, one can quickly see how this leads to the more hidden effect that the political discourse on societal security and immigration has in the wider decisions concerning asylum seekers. In the Kosovo case, the political discourse was overwhelmed by another factor. As one can confirm through various humanitarian organisations[4], the “pressure of public opinion” exercised upon the government (as it was also evident in Italy), forced France’s agreement to admit between 5000 and 10,000 Kosovar refugees.

Although upon the arrival of 6339 refugees from camps in Macedonia the government broadly accepted their legitimate refugee status, their legal status was initially uncertain and a series of ad-hoc rules were applied. But as the author rightly observes, “informality, variability and executive discretion – continued to shape the French reaction to the arrival of Bosnian refugees in the early 1990s and still mark the approach towards people fleeing ethnic cleansing in Kosovo”. The powerful comparison between the self perception of “terre d’asile” and the recent “asylum as a threat to society and national culture” syndrome, underlines the paradox of France as a confused country within an increasingly paranoid EU setting where the 1951 Geneva Convention is constantly being challenged. This contradiction is underlined by the 1993 law on “territorial asylum” which was no longer based upon the 1951 Convention terms. As Lavenex underlines, (temporary protection) “was not, however, an answer to the increasing reality of war and civil war as causes of refugee flows”. In the author’s view, “…the French reaction seems to be disappointing”.

These two chapters (as the rest of the book) do an excellent job in describing the institutionalization of ad-hoc, temporary forms of protection applied by EU states when faced with specific refugee crisis. As the two researchers clearly demonstrate, refugee situations such as that of Bosnia, manage to get all EU countries to commit to a harmonization of asylum policies, however, no common EU policy was applied when the Kosovo crisis followed. The insights on national debates of France and Italy offer solid evidential basis for Van Selm’s broader theoretical discussion on societal security, xenophobia and comprehensive approach.

In both cases of Italy and France, immigration and asylum are seen as increasing threats to their societies which has given rise to a national xenophobia about asylum seekers. While public solidarity overwhelms this xenophobia during extreme crisis such as that of Kosovo, “illegals” and “organized crime” remain everyday terms within the larger national political debates and continue to have an impact on the progress of a common EU approach to asylum and immigration matters. Although Italy and France accepted that the Kosovar refugees fell well under the terms of asylum, both governments applied the alternative forms of protection while undermining the refugee rights guaranteed by the 1951 Convention.

If the book is strong in providing a detailed overview of the legal framework, what Hein and Lavenex lack, is a deeper discussion on whether recent new forms of ad-hoc asylum rules should or can start a European debate on the “international norms” which characterize the 1951 Geneva Convention. Should this Convention be revised in the light of recent refugee crisis and if not, why is a common EU asylum policy needed?

Moreover, the authors fail to consider one other important factor, the opinions of thousands of Kosovar refugees whose very protection is being approached in a theoretical matter. Could one talk of asylum laws and fail to take into account the very central component of asylum, the “seeker” himself?

However, while the title can be deceiving, “Kosovo’s Refugees in the European Union” as a whole offers a comprehensive understanding of the asylum policies and its implementation by EU governments. It is evident that its contribution to the further progress of asylum research is invaluable.

Primary Online Sources

UNHCR, The state of the world’s refugees, 2000, http://www.unhcr.ch/

CIR Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati, http://www.cir-onlus.org/

The Economist, http://www.economist.com/

Forum Refugies France, http://www.forumrefugies.org/

The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/

Gazeta Shekulli, http://www.shekulli.com.al/

Gazeta Shqiptare, http://www.balkanweb.com/

Institute for War & Peace Reporting, http://www.iwpr.net/

Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty.org/

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[1] Joanne van Selm is Senior Policy Analyst at the Migration Policy Institute, a Washington DC based think tank
devoted to the study of international migration. Dr van Selm is also affiliated as an Associate Professor to the University of Amsterdam's Department of Political Science.

[2] Christopher Hein is Director of the Italian Refugee Council, Rome, Italy.

[3] Sandra Lavenex is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Zurich, Switzerland.

[4] Look at http://www.forumrefugies.org/

Ku janë programet Zoti Kryeministër???

GAZETA SHQIPTARE
13 Prill 2006

Diaspora, një prej kontribuesve kryesorë ndaj ekonomisë shqiptare, është lënë krejtësisht në harresë prej qeverive shqiptare të 15 vjetëve të fundit. Nëse qeveria e mëparshme karakterizohej nga një mospërfillje totale, kjo e fundit po tregon shenja inefikasiteti në marrëdhëniet e saj me shoqatat diasporike. Eshtë më se e qartë që Shqipëria nuk do të merrte kurrë frymë pa kontributin financiar të shumicës së forcës së punës që është e detyruar të fitojë jetesën e saj jashtë shtetit dhe larg të afërmve të tyre. Si e tillë, ajo duhet vlerësuar dhe duhet integruar në zhvillimin e vendit. Në fakt, qeveria Berisha na e ka dhënë fjalën. Në programin e saj ajo premton se “Për këtë brez, por edhe për brezin e vjetër të emigrantëve, të cilët kanë kontribute të jashtëzakonshme historike për vendin, qeveria përkushtohet për një integrim të tyre në jetën politike, ekonomike e sociale të vendit si dhe me po aq përkushtim edhe për të drejtat e tyre themelore në vendet ku jetojnë. ...qeveria do të adoptojë programe që emigrantët të rikthehen dhe të investojnë në vendin tyre... qeveria do të investojë për ngritjen e qendrave kulturore dhe për kryerjen e aktiviteteve të ndryshme në bashkëpunim me shoqatat e emigrantëve shqiptarë kudo që janë...”

Asnjë prej këtyre premtimeve nuk do të mund të mbahet sepse ende nuk ka filluar implementimi i ndonjë programi konkret ku diaspora të ndjehet si pjesëmarrëse në jetën politike apo sociale të vendit. Përgjatë kësaj analize të shkurtër do të mundohem të provoj se këto premtime kanë ngecur në një nivel retorik dhe do parashtroj disa pika për shtytjen që i duhet bërë qeverisë në mënyrë që ajo të jetë e aftë të afrojë elementët më të përgatitur të diasporës në jetën politike, sociale dhe ekonomike të vendit.

Nuk duhet harruar që diaspora nuk është thjesht një grupim emocional i emigrantëve në vendet ku jetojnë. Ajo përfaqëson një burim të pasur njerëzor potenciali i të cilit nuk është përdorur ende në strategjitë e zhvillimit. Diaspora duhet ndarë në tre shtylla kryesore. Së pari, ajo mbart elementin individual ekonomik që garanton prurjet financiare. Ky kontribut financiar përfaqëson të paktën një të pestën (për të mos thënë shumë më tepër) e Produktit Kombëtar Brut (PNB) ose GNP në rrethet ekonomike ndërkombëtare, që në fakt është një nga treguesit kryesorë të mirëqenies së një vendi. Por si në shumë vende të tjera që kishin një varësi ekonomike nga emigrantët e tyre, edhe në Shqipëri do të vihet re që eventualisht, prurjet nga jashtë nuk do të jenë burim i besueshëm për rritjen ekonomike të një vendi. Përmirësimi i mirëqenies së vendit amë do të shoqërohet nga një tendencë uljeje të prurjeve të diasporës. Sidoqoftë prurjet e emigrantëve, që janë të karakterit individual, kanë vite që funksionojnë pavarësisht qeverive në pushtet. Infrastruktura e bankave dhe firmave private të transferimit të parave egziston dhe funksionon pa probleme të konsiderueshme. Pra në këtë aspekt, nuk kërkohet ndonjë angazhim i madh nga qeveria.

Kjo na sjell tek shtylla e dytë e diasporës, ajo e burimeve njerëzore. Janë me qindra mijëra studentë dhe profesionistë që përbëjnë një prej potencialeve më të paprekura nga Shqipëria. Këta elementë studiojnë dhe punojnë në institucionet akademike dhe profesionale më me emër në botë. Si të tillë, këta janë të gatshëm të kontribuojnë në zhvillimin e infrastrukturës institucionale të zhvillimit të vendit. Ata mund dhe duhet të afrohen pranë instancave qeveritare dhe sociale për të kthyer në vend ‘rrjedhjen e trurit’ që e ka paralizuar prej vitesh Shqipërinë. Deri më sot, egziston një iniciativë e UNDP nën emrin ‘Brain Gain’ (Thithja e Trurit) që synon tërheqjen në vend të këtyre elementëve të përgatitur. Gjithashtu Lëvizja MJAFT! u ka mundësuar shumë studentëve të vijnë dhe të ingranohen në stazhe të shkurtra nëpër institucionet publike. Në këtë pikë, qeveria është treguar e gatshme të bashkëpunojë me të tilla organizma ndërkombëtare dhe të shoqërisë civile për inkurajimin e thithjes së trurit por mbetet shumë për t’u bërë.

Për një vend si Shqipëria, me një përqindje kaq të lartë të popullsisë së saj jashtë kufijve, është e turpshme që nuk egziston një ministri apo departament i veçantë që të zhvillojë një strategji dhe të ndërmarrë hapa konkretë drejt përfshirjes së diasporës në jetën sociale dhe politike të vendit. Një Shqiptar i diasporës nuk do dinte kurrë se ku të trokiste apo ku të aplikonte për t’u rikthyer ne vendin e tij. Përfshirja e këtyre elementëve intelektualë nuk po shihet si një domosodoshmëri nga qeveria aktuale dhe ka mbetur në nivele programesh të izoluara apo retorike të bukur që po rrjedhon në dekurajimin e vazhdueshëm të diasporës. Sa më shumë kalojnë vitet, aq më shumë shtohen shancet e nguljes së përhershme të këtyre elementëve në vendet e rezidencës. Duhet të ketë një strategji të qartë që të afrojë të paktën ata individë të pasigurtë që ende nuk e kanë gjetur veten atje ku jetojnë.

Shtylla e tretë e diasporës përbëhet nga strukturat organizative, qofshin këto kulturore, ekonomike apo mediatike. Si në SHBA por edhe në Angli, Itali, Greqi, Gjermani dhe dhe vende të tjera, funksionojnë shumë shoqata shqiptare që punojnë me komunitetin përkatës. Në këtë pikë, kontributi është i dyanshëm. Nga njëra anë, këto struktura ndihmojnë në promovimin e vlerave kulturore shqiptare në botë, gjë që çon në përmirësimin e imazhit të Shqipërisë dhe nga ana tjetër, ato mund të kontribuojnë në Shqipëri me investime. Këtë qeveria e di shumë mirë sepse ndryshe nuk do t’a përfshinte në programin e saj të pasur me premtime shumëngjyrëshe. Biles kohët e fundit, Ministri i Jashtëm Z. Mustafaj u takua me një grup Shqiptarësh në Londër ku kërkoi që këta individë të vinin dhe të investonin në Shqipëri ose t’i ftonin miqtë e tyre Anglezë të bënin të njëjtën gjë. Fatkeqësisht, ministri nuk la kohë për diskutim që të dëgjonte shqetësimet e Shqiptarëve në Britani të Madhe. Nuk u pyet se çfarë imazhi ka Shqipëria në sytë e një investitori të huaj. Nuk u pyet se çfarë dëshiron diaspora nga qeveria shqiptare apo se çfarë mund t’i ofrojmë ne Shqipërisë. Dhe kur mungon ky nivel kaq elementar i komunikimit, si mund të priten programe dhe investime nga qeveria shqiptare për diasporën? Nuk kemi vënë re ende ndonjë bashkëpunim konkret mes qeverisë dhe shoqatave të diasporës. Eshtë e vërtetë që strukturat e ambasadave (me sa munden) janë gjithnjë të gatshme për të na inkurajuar. Të paktën kjo është e vërtetë në rastin e Londrës, ku Ambasada Shqiptare bashkëpunon në mënyrë të vazhdueshme me shoqatat shqiptare të Britanisë së Madhe. Psh, para disa javësh Klubi Londinez i Lëvizjes MJAFT! dhe Ambasada Shqiptare mblodhën studentët shqiptarë ne Angli për të nxitur kontributin e tyre ndaj vendit amë. Por si mund të arrihet kjo pa formulimin e një politike të qartë nga ana e Tiranës apo Prishtinës? Ende nuk po vihet re ndonjë shenjë investimi financiar nga ana e qeverisë që do të mundësonte një bashkëpunim konkret me diasporën. Vallë ku të kenë shkuar paratë që duhet të ishin alokuar për pikat e programit qeveritar ku trajtohet diaspora?

E përballur me këtë inefikasitet, diaspora nuk duhet të presë shumë iniciativa nga qeveritarët por të fillojë e të organizohet vetë për t’a detyruar qeverinë shqiptare të mbajë premtimet. Nëse gjykohet nga niveli i kontributit që ajo jep për Shqipërinë, atëhere është e mundshme që strukturat e saj të ushtrojnë një lloj presioni ndaj qeverisë. Deri tani kemi parë që diaspora në Amerikë ka qenë paksa më e organizuar për sa i përket fuqisë së lobingut. Gjithashtu po vërehen iniciativa në Angli, Itali dhe Greqi. Eshtë e qartë që duhen identifikuar shqetësimet reale të diasporës dhe t’i bëhen të ditur Tiranës. Duhet gjetur mënyra e bashkëpunimit mes shoqatave të ndryshme të diasporës në botë që zëri i saj të dëgjohet më pranë qeverisë shqiptare. Përderisa qeveria shqiptare e ka hedhur hapin e parë, atë të retorikës, diaspora shqiptare duhet të hedhë hapin e dytë, atë të praktikës, duke kushtëzuar në mënyrë të vazhdueshme hapat e qeverisë në strategjinë e saj ndaj diasporës.

Sot, qeveria premton programe që do nxisin investimet e diasporës dhe investime nga ana e saj për të bashkëpunuar me shoqatat e ndryshme shqiptare të diasporës. Kjo është ‘fenomenale’ … ‘famoze’ për t’a shprehur me gjuhën e kryeministrit Berisha, por çfarë është bërë deri tani??? Përgjigja është një varg pikëpyetjesh që do të mbulonte faqet e tërë gazetës. Pra ashtu siç Ministri i Jashtëm në emër të qeverisë kërkon investime nga diaspora, po në të njëjtën mënyrë dhe me më shumë forcë i duhet kërkuar Z. Berisha: “Ku janë programet Zoti Kryeministër?”…